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This paper discusses mechanisms of grand corruption in 
private sector utility provision in developing countries. 
By the term “grand corruption,” the authors abstract 
from the petty corruption that consumers experience 
—for example, when firms and individuals pay bribes 
to get water delivery or an electricity connection. The 
paper focuses on decisions made at the government 
level involving private sector management, ownership, 
and provision of utility services.  Corruption at that 
This paper—a product of the Economics Division, Finance, Economics and Urban Department—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to analyze the extent and impact of corruption in infrastructure. Policy Research Working Papers are 
also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at tsoreide@worldbank.org.  
level may influence the pace and nature of private sector 
involvement and competition in utilities, as well as the 
level and form of investments, subsidies, and prices. On 
the basis of a literature review and interviews with firms 
and regulating authorities in two countries, Tanzania 
and the Philippines, this paper discusses the levels and 
determinants of grand corruption in utilities. The paper 
concludes by discussing a research program to extend this 
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Contact information authors: ckenny@worldbank.org; tsoreide@worldbank.org  1 Introduction 
The poor performance of utility services in low and middle-income countries has been a concern for 
the development community for decades.  Engineers, economists and lawyers have suggested a range 
of methods to optimize performance by tackling institutional weaknesses, reducing incentive 
problems, and addressing the challenge of multiple government objectives. The privatization of utility 
provision was one approach widely used in the 1990s.  Unfortunately, the performance of privatized 
industries has not always lived up to expectations. One potential reason underlying this poor 
performance record and stymieing further efforts towards reform is corruption.  
 
This paper discusses corruption in private infrastructure provision as a development issue.  After a 
brief clarification of terminology, it examines the nature of utility provision and the sources of rents 
that the sector generates.  It turns to existing evidence on the size, nature and causes of grand 
corruption in private infrastructure provision before proposing a survey-based strategy to increase our 
understanding of the extent and causes of such corruption in private utility provision.  
 
2 Grand Corruption in Private Infrastructure–An Important Development Issue 
Access to basic infrastructure services has expanded over the past few decades in developing 
countries.  At the same time, there is a widespread sense of disappointment in the reach, quality and 
sustainability of utility provision.  For example, in low-income countries only a little more than a third 
of the population had access to electricity in 2000, transmission and distribution losses accounted for 
an average of one-quarter of production, and firms involved in the sector frequently operated at a 
significant loss.   
 
In the 1990s, the most common answer to this poor performance was to introduce greater private 
sector participation in the management and ownership of infrastructure. And although the overall 
efficiency benefits of private participation have been positive, fiscal costs have remained high and 
rollout of new services slow.  Furthermore, the extent of the liberalization has been limited in many 
countries (Estache and Goicoechea, 2005).  The popularity of private participation has also fallen.  The 
private sector only accounted for about 22 percent of investments in infrastructure between 1984 and 
2003, and in water and sanitation this proportion drops to 5 percent (Estache, 2006).  The 
disappointing status of private infrastructure provision in many countries still suggests the need for a 
critical review of the implementation of these policies (Estache, 2006). 
 
Explanations for the weak performance of private provision include weak design of reform efforts, 
over-inflated initial hopes, and unexpected real-world obstacles to reform. Major challenges are rooted 
in weak access to capital and difficulties in attracting private sector investments due to high fixed costs 
and long pay-back periods, few potential competitors, weak ability of governments to enter into long-
term contracts, and the low capacity of governmental and regulatory institutions (Estache, 2006; 
Laffont, 2005; Kessides, 2004).   
 
Related to these concerns is the issue of governance.  Because of the natural monopoly characteristics 
of utility provision, regulation is required to bring performance closer to an economically efficient 
outcome. At the same time, the sectors represent services that are essential to a broad range of users, 
making their provision and pricing politically sensitive (Kessides, 2004:30). These characteristics 
make utilities a continuing and natural target for government intervention, be they in private or public 
hands.   
 
  2And while private participation in infrastructure changes the opportunities to extract rents from a 
sector which involves high sunk costs, natural monopolies and considerable government financing, it 
does not necessarily diminish the size of those rents.  Indeed, given the extensive transfer of assets that 
increased private participation entails, it may considerably increase the opportunities for rent 
extraction, at least in the short term.  Evidence suggesting widespread corruption related to 
privatization processes is considerable (Black et al., 2000). There is also a growing body of anecdotal 
evidence (discussed at greater length in later sections of the paper) suggesting that corruption 
contributes to sub-optimal public-private investment decisions and high costs to government for 
privately generated electricity supply (Kenny, 2007).  
 
At the same time, it is difficult to estimate the full impact of corruption on the sector because of the 
multiple channels through which it can affect outcomes.  We do not have data on the scale of bribe 
payments in infrastructure, but even if we did, the indirect or long-term effects (such as the choice of 
projects and technical solutions, the level of competition prescribed and the nature of concession 
contracts) will usually be more harmful than the direct financial costs associated with such payments.
2  
Again, the impacts of corruption may not be observable in the form of lower levels of private 
investments in infrastructure,
3 but may instead influence the type of investments selected (Smarzynska 
and Wei, 2000; Uhlenbruck et al., 2005), with knock-on effects in terms of quality on services, 
accessibility and prices (Estache, Goicoechea and Trujillo, 2006).   
 
These circumstances underscore the importance of gathering data and analysis not just on the scale of 
payments, but what payments are made for -- how corruption may influence operational contract 
terms, the contents of concessions, and opportunities for firms to exercise market power through 
higher prices. In turn, it would be valuable to have a considerably greater empirical understanding of 
the factors which foster (or at least accompany) corrupt payments —for example renegotiation of 
terms after contract signature (Guasch, 2004). 
 
Despite potentially very severe consequences, grand corruption in utilities is an under-researched 
phenomenon, compared to other forms of corruption and also compared to other governance 
challenges in infrastructure. We do not have a clear picture of the mechanisms at play; i.e. how 
corruption influences public-private interactions, competition in the sector, policy and regulatory 
issues, as well as decisions regarding large contracts and concessions.  
 
In order to understand the perspectives of different players involved in the private provision of utility 
services, a pilot study was undertaken by the authors which included interviews of business leaders, 
representatives of the government and regulatory authorities, as well as other relevant actors, in two 
countries, Tanzania and the Philippines. Around 25 interviews were conducted, with questions relating 
to the business environment, regulation, decision-making processes at government and regulatory 
level, the bidding procedures, responses in cases of unfair treatment or corruption, and issues related to 
governance and corruption in general. Results of the study will be referred to in following sections, 
although these are qualitative data provided under a strong commitment to preserve confidentiality and 
anonymity of individual responses and may not allow for generalizations (Box 2 outlines the study).  
The study, a literature review and analysis carried out in subsequent sections of this paper form the 
                                                           
2 For discussions about the various indirect adverse effects of corruption, see for example, Rose-Ackerman 
(1978, 2006), Tirole (1986), de Soto (1990), Andvig and Moene (1990), Besley and McLaren (1993), Bardhan 
(1997), Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Gupta et al. (2001).  There is also a number of relevant rent-seeking results, 
see Congleton,, et al. (2007) for a good overview.  
3 Whereas several studies find corruption to have a negative impact on foreign direct investment in general (Wei, 
2000), the impact on domestic private investments is found to be significantly weaker (Habib and Zurawicki, 
2002).  There is, however, strong evidence for a negative association between infrastructure quality and FDI 
attractiveness.   
  3basis for a proposal to carry out a cross-country survey analysis of grand corruption in utilities 
outlined in the last section of this paper. 
 
 
Box I: Examples of governance failures potentially related to grand corruption in utilities 
Biased decision in favor of incompetent electricity provider  
In Tanzania the president dissolved the cabinet in February after accepting the resignation of the prime 
minister and two cabinet ministers. It is alleged that the Prime Minister’s office improperly awarded a 
contract to a US-based electricity company. A parliamentary inquiry, launched in November, found that the 
generators failed to arrive on time, and that when they did, they did not work as required. Despite these 
alleged failings, the government was contracted to pay the company $140,000 a day. The inquiry alleges that 
the Prime Minister’s office later influenced the government’s decision to extend the company’s contract 
despite advice to the contrary from the state-run energy company Tanesco. Source: Transparency 
International Reports. 
Transfers made to influence the award of water contracts  
In Milan, Italy in 2002 a senior executive of Vivendi (now Veolia) was convicted of planning to bribe local 
politicians in both the majority and opposition parties of Milan city council in order to win the IT£200bn 
tender for a wastewater treatment plant in the south of Milan, Italy. The executive planned to pay total IT£ 
4bn bribes to politicians. In July 1997, a junior French minister was jailed for two years, with a further two 
suspended, and fined one million francs (£94,800) for taking bribes from companies bidding in public 
tenders. The minister reportedly had received fees of 327,000 francs $48,000) for a fictitious job by 
Compagnie Generale des Eaux (renamed Vivendi and now Veolia) in exchange for giving the utility a water 
distribution contract in Angouleme. Source: Friends of the Earth and UNICORN. 
 
Allegations of political corruption in too expensive power project  
Enron’s Dabhol Power Corporation (DBC) signed a deal on power provision in 1993 in India, despite 
warnings from the World Bank that the project was too expensive. It was later alleged that local politicians 
had been paid off with bribes, while it was also claimed that local police and thugs had been hired to terrorize 
the opponents of the deal into silence. In 1999 DBC produced power at a price pegged to the world oil price, 
seven times higher than other electricity costs in India. Sources: Various newspapers and Common Dreams 
NewsCenter. 
Alleged corruption behind power plant deal  
In the Philippines, corruption was alleged behind a $470 million build-rehabilitate-operate-transfer contract 
for the Caliraya-Botocan-Kalayaan hydroelectric power plant, which was awarded in 2001. This award was 
made on the strength of a legal opinion by the then justice secretary, allegedly rendered in exchange for a $2-
million bribe.  Sources: Manila Mail and UNICORN. 
Allegations of bribery for telecom and railway contracts  
Alcatel, the French multinational company, has been linked to bribery allegations in Costa Rica, Taiwan and 
Africa. Alcatel allegedly transferred $15 million to a consulting firm between 2000 and 2003 to obtain 
cellular networks contracts with Costa Rico's national carrier, ICE. Costa Rican prosecutors allege that some 
of this money was used to pay bribes. A former Costa Rican power and telecommunications director was 
quoted as saying that he and the Costa Rican president at the time had received a $2.4 million bribe from 
Alcatel in 2001. In the Taiwan case executives from Alcatel's Taiwanese subsidiary (along with Siemens 
AG's) are being investigated because of allegations that they bribed officials in $27.4 million worth of 
railway contracts awarded in 2003, according to an Alcatel filing with the SEC in November (2004). Alcatel's 
Taiwan Chief Executive was arrested in June as part of the probe. Source: UNICORN.  
 
 
2.1 Terminology  
As in other industries, corruption might influence the performance of utilities occurs in different ways.  
Bribes in the delivery of services are one category, often called petty corruption; they are a huge 
  4challenge in many countries. Utility managers or their staff may restrict delivery to extort customers or 
offer illegal connections in return for payments. The consequence is poorer performance of the 
industries, often facilitated through corruption in monitoring mechanisms. This form of corruption, 
between service-providers and end-users, is reported in several surveys. Fairly reliable data have been 
generated, and the phenomenon has become more accessible for research (Clarke and Xu, 2004).  
 
Grand corruption, which involves higher decision-levels in a country, is conceptually quite different 
from petty corruption. It includes cases when politicians or high-ranking civil servants manipulate a 
country’s management or regulation of infrastructure industries to gain exclusive benefits (see Box 1 
for examples). It can be a ‘purely’ public sector phenomenon or involve both public and private 
agents.  In the first case, state-owned public service providers serve as tools for politicians, who 
benefit in the form of personal revenues, bolstered positions, or party contributions.  In the case of 
public-private interactions, private sector actors use bribes to influence the form of the market or 
contractual terms at the cost of consumer welfare.  Sometimes these phenomena are described as crony 
capitalism, in which political networks dominate important private assets, or state capture, in which 
private firms are able to influence public power to their own benefit.
4  
 
These categories are simplifications. Various forms of corruption will often be interlinked, or made 
possible, through other forms of crime.
  The dividing line between petty and grand corruption can 
become blurred, for instance if utility management abuse their status as principals within the 
institution of the utility to overlook petty corruption in return for payments from staff.   
 
With that caveat, grand corruption as opposed to petty corruption, frequently involves changing rather 
than breaking rules and institutional structures.  For example, petty corruption may involve theft of 
electricity with the collusion of utility staff.  Grand corruption may involve altering bid rules to ensure 
that a particular firm is selected.
5  Of course, both cases may involve breaking laws, but grand 
corruption may be more difficult to delineate because officials act within their authority when altering 
institutional structures or outcomes.  
 
For a conceptual explanation of the difference, consider the principal-agent framework versus political 
agency:  Petty corruption refers to officials (agents) who profit personally from making choices that 
deviate from the goals of the institution that they represent. Such corruption is possible because the 
managers of the institution (principals) have insufficient capacity or incentive to monitor decisions 
made in the institution that they administer.
6  
 
With grand corruption it is the "managers” (politicians) who deviate from the goal of the country and a 
welfare-enhancing track, while the electorate are the “principals” who have insufficient information 
about their politicians and the choices they make. A main contrast between petty and grand corruption 
thus relates to the monitoring mechanisms, which can be far better organized when petty corruption is 
the problem. With grand corruption, elected politicians are often directly or indirectly controlling 
supposed monitoring mechanisms, including the media as well as the judicial system.  
                                                           
4 The state capture terms was introduced by Hellman et al. (2003).  Michael Johnston (2005) is more precise 
about political corruption, when suggesting a distinction between what he calls “power chasing wealth” and 
“wealth chasing power”.  See Rose-Ackerman (2007) for a discussion. 
5 When it comes to corruption in general, it is important to distinguish between legal forms of influence, such as 
lobby-groups, and illegal corruption, because it can be shown that these are characteristically different 
mechanisms with different consequences (Harstad and Svensson, 2008).  
6 Accordingly, the principal-agent framework is much applied to understand corruption; see for instance Mishra 
(2006), Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), Olsen and Torsvik (1998) and Laffont and Martimort (1997). This 
literature separates importantly between benevolent and non-benevolent principals (Aidt, 2003). In political 
economy models, the politicians are often thought of as agents while the voters are the principals, and this too is 
a useful approach (see Besley (2006), for instance).  
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2.2 The Nature of the Utility Sector and Sources of Rents  
There are reasons to believe that infrastructure provision is particularly prone to grand corruption. 
Many infrastructure services are natural monopolies, involving significant fixed costs. Related to this, 
competition in these sectors is seldom subject to antitrust control to the same degrees as other 
industries.
7  The level of technical complexity, combined with complex financial contracting, provides 
numerous ways of hiding corrupt transactions. Governments play a significant role in construction, 
supply and regulation of utilities. Regulatory decisions and the awards of concessions are often based 
on non-transparent decision processes which provide significant latitude to officials, and corruption 
can easily be hidden behind discretionary bureaucratic judgments or populist political decisions.   
During the pilot survey, some reported experiences of “informal award criteria.” In one of the 
countries, although the formal rules and criteria appeared professional, the companies competing for a 
concession often reportedly had informal meetings with very senior government officials – an 
arrangement that might facilitate ‘grand corruption.’ Box 1 suggests some cases of governance failure 
in the private provision of infrastructure, some of which have involved allegations of corruption.  
 
In addition to the presence of considerable rents which can provide financing for corrupt payments, the 
high sunk costs of infrastructure investments provides additional incentives to bribe to reduce political 
uncertainty.  In all infrastructure provision, with the partial exception of mobile telephony, there are 
long pay-back periods associated with sunk-cost investments.  Alongside the political sensitivity of 
infrastructure pricing and access, the long payback period makes the pricing of risk a significant part 
of any investment decision.  Negotiation of pricing (of services or infrastructure) or related factors that 
will determine the rate of return of the investment, will hinge on political risk calculations.  Attempts 
to preserve that rate of return from direct or indirect expropriation may involve a mitigation strategy 
involving payoffs to decision-makers.
8   
 
Infrastructure services vary in terms of the contributions of the public and private sectors (See Tables 
1 and 2).  At one end of the spectrum, mobile telecommunications services are provided privately and 
under a competitive regime in the vast majority of countries. There is comparatively little pressure to 
provide services at below cost or to subsidize access. Although some telecommunications sub-sectors 
frequently remain in government hands and subsidy mechanisms for access exist in a number of 
countries, the predominant roles for government in the sector are to (i) distribute rights to limited 
spectrum and (ii) ensure fair competition between providers.  This suggests that the largest 
opportunities for rent extraction involve the issuance of spectrum licences and the process for setting 
interconnection prices (which is technically complex with no one obviously superior approach).  In 
addition, in countries that retain public ownership of the fixed operator and/or limited international 
rights, the privatization and license issuance processes in these sub-sectors will also provide 
opportunities to extract rents. 
 
At the other extreme, very few water and sanitation firms worldwide operate under full private 
ownership, with concession and management models predominant.  Competition in the market is 
                                                           
7 See Cave and Crother (2004) and Harker and Waddams Price (2004) for discussion about the link to collusion, 
and Celentani and Ganuzab (2002) and Comte, Lambert-Mogiliansky and Verdier (2005) on corruption and 
collusion in procurement, whereas Rose-Ackerman (1978), Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Ades and Di Tella 
(1999) all suggest a greater role for corruption in environments of limited competition.  
8 See Wells and Ahmed (2007) for examples of bribery to reduce political risk in infrastructure investments. See 
Harstad and Svensson (2008) for an analysis of rent seeking versus corruption, and the importance of hold-up 
problems. During interviews as part of the pilot study it was claimed that arbitration is no solution to hold-up 
problems. According to one respondent: “Verdicts can be made in foreign courts but they are not enforced in 
this country.” 
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effectively absent, focusing attention on the design of competition for the market (from direct 
negotiation models to transparent international bidding).  Concession contracts and related regulatory 
oversight involve a considerably larger role for government negotiation or imposition of terms with 
significant consequences on rates of return for private utility companies.  These can include decisions 
regarding investment requirements, employment levels, service quality, pricing and rates of return. 
The sensitivity of water pricing increases the political risk associated with such contracts and with the 
regulation of implementation. 
 
Like water and sanitation, electricity distribution remains a natural monopoly where full private 
provision remains comparatively rare, and similar sources of rents are likely to emerge.  Electricity 
production–at least in larger markets—is notably different in that it can be comparatively competitive.  
Having said that, many developing countries are too small to allow for truly competitive power 
production given market size. This raises concerns regarding service reliability and over-dependence 
on a single power source. In such countries power purchase agreements are frequently negotiated 
directly by governments or with a government guarantee and involve numerous conditions that can 
alter rates of return –including pricing schedules, take-or-pay conditions, and purchase or pricing 
agreements related to fuel inputs.  Given the limited role for competition in the market in these cases, 
there are considerable rents to be generated through the design of competition for the market.  Power 
producers are also subject to regulation.  Alongside rents attached to the avoidance or payment of 
environmental externalities, the political complexity of cost-recovery and a frequent overlap in 
government oversight of pricing between regulator and ministry can create further opportunities for 
rent creation.  
 
The (largely) non-rival monopoly nature of toll roads suggests that the monopoly profit-maximizing 
toll could be substantially different from the economic benefit-maximizing toll, suggesting, in turn, the 
potential for particularly large rents in the negotiation of road-pricing agreements.  In addition, the 
considerable proportion of road costs accounted for by land procurement opens up the opportunity for 
rent associated with the eminent domain process. 
 
The impact of these different sector and contracting characteristics of different utility services is likely 
to translate into different opportunities for corruption. These differences are examined later in the text. 
  
Table 1: Characteristics, Contracting and Rents in Infrastructure Provision 
  Electricity 
Production 
Electricity 
Distribution  Toll roads  Water and 
Sanitation  Telecoms 
Economic 
characteristics 






Non-rival, public good 
elements (land), 
natural monopoly 















concession  Concession  Management, lease, 






























Table 2: Contract Forms and Responsibilities 
  Management 






Investment planning   Government  Negotiated Negotiated Private  Private 
Capital financing  Government Government Private Private Private 
Bearer of 
commercial risk   Mainly government  Mainly private  Private  Private  Private 
Guarantee (supply 
price, political risk)  NA NA Frequent  No  Frequent 
  
3 Evidence on the Extent of Corruption versus Grand Corruption in Utilities  
Matching theoretical approaches and assumptions, there is considerable evidence that corruption 
is a significant issue in infrastructure provision. At the operational level, Gulati and Rao (2006) 
find that, in Bangladesh and Orissa, in India, around 55 percent of generated power is paid for; 
the rest is lost to technical and commercial losses. Of this, perhaps 15-18 percent is accounted 
for by ‘true technical’ losses, suggesting leakage due to illegal connections or underbilling 
accounts for as much as 30 percent of generated power. Davis (2004) suggests that unaccounted 
for water accounts for 35 percent of total flows in India.  
 
At the statistical level across countries, we have mounting survey evidence regarding petty 
corruption related to utility provision.  Global evidence on the extent of payments for 
connections to energy, water and electricity are provided by the World Bank’s enterprise 
surveys, and this can be used to uncover correlations with sector characteristics and outcomes 
(Clarke and Xu, 2002; Kenny, 2006). 
 
Regarding grand corruption in utility provision, existing data provide an ample basis for case-
study analysis of grand corruption throughout the infrastructure cycle –from policy through 
construction to operation (see, for example Davis, 2004; Gulati and Rao, 2006; and Cross and 
Plummer, 2006).  For one element of this process –construction—we also have survey evidence.  
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), which covered 4,000 
firms in 22 transition countries, provides information about firms’ expenses in various forms of 
bribery (Hellman et al., 2000). Analysis of these data suggest that construction firms pay 
considerably more than the average firm in bribes, with a focus on bypassing regulation and 
obtaining government contracts (Kenny, 2007).   
 
At the same time, existing enterprise surveys have excluded infrastructure providers on the 
grounds that, at the country level, there are too few firms to guarantee response anonymity or to 
ensure statistical confidence in answers.  This has left analyses of the extent and impact of grand 
corruption in infrastructure relying on proxy or general measures of corruption. Most widely 
used in such studies have been general perceptions indices such as Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (for example Estache, Goicoechea and Trujillo, 2006; Tanzi and 
Davoodi, 1998). 
 
Cross-country perception indices of corruption have played an important role in raising 
awareness of corruption and emphasizing the importance of institutions in development.  There 
are strong correlations between governance indices and GDP growth (Kaufmann et al., 2006), 
and numerous empirical studies point to (perceived) corruption as an important reason for slow 
economic development (Mauro, 1997; Leite and Weidemann, 1999; Poirson, 1998; Mo, 2001).  
Studies utilizing general perceptions measures have also provided some interesting suggestive 
evidence regarding impacts on infrastructure. –Tanzi and Davoodi (1998) find that general 
corruption perceptions scores are correlated with lower quality infrastructure provision and low 
expenditures on maintenance.  Using a dataset covering 80 electricity distribution firms in 13 
Latin American countries in 1994-2001, Bo and Rossi (2007) find corruption to be the most 
important explanatory factor behind variation in efficiency among the companies.  Guasch and 
Straub (2005) find that perceptions of corruption are linked to an increased likelihood of 
infrastructure firm-led contract renegotiation in the presence of weak regulatory bodies, also this 
study was based on data from Latin-America.  Estache, Goicoechea and Trujillo (2006) find 
perceived corruption correlated with lower energy use, and interaction effects between sector 
policies and the impact of corruption.  
Nonetheless, there are significant concerns with using general perceptions measures for analysis 
of grand corruption in infrastructure. Where we can compare perceptions measures with audited 
levels of corruption at the micro level, perceptions appear to be weakly related to audited 
measures and to contain significant biases (Olken, 2006).  Knack (2006) demonstrates how 
corruption perception indices correlate far better with data on petty corruption than 
procurement-related corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and also that petty 
corruption appears to be only weakly correlated to levels of grand corruption.  Donchev and 
Ujheliyi (2008) find perceptions-based corruption indices exposed to systematic biases away 
from actual experience with the problem, and influenced by other governance characteristics, 
such as democracy, and country size. Langbein and Knack (2008) explain and prove the 
problem of separating between governance indicators, such as those presented by the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators project. The extent of corruption in a country can not be 
estimated without running into problems of multicollinearity. Furthermore, country-level 
perceptions appear to be weakly related to surveyed levels of corruption in particular sectors. 
For example, there is no significant relationship between Transparency International’s CPI and 
surveyed levels of corruption amongst construction firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  
And finally, the lack of specificity in general corruption measures allows us to learn nothing 
about how the nature of corruption differs across countries within infrastructure provision. 
These problems with using general perceptions measures as a proxy for grand corruption in 
infrastructure may help to account for the limited robustness of results in the existing literature 
on corruption and infrastructure outcomes (Kenny, 2006).
9  
 
The lack of sector-specific survey data on the extent and nature of grand corruption in 
infrastructure is a significant impediment to evaluating measures designed to reduce the 
development impact of poor governance and corruption, then. Existing policy and regulatory 
advice can only be based on case studies, examination of weak general proxies or global results 
(see for example Gulati and Rao, 2006; Cross and Plummer, 2006; Clarke and Xu, 2002, Cavill 
and Sohail, 2007; Lederman et. al., 2005).  Whilst it is plausible to imagine, based on this work, 
that transparency, participation, competition, reduced regulatory and licensing discretion, 
deregulation, improved financial management and extended auditing may all have a role to play, 
the relative role of specific interventions on the level and impact of grand corruption in 
infrastructure cannot be evaluated (Kenny, 2006). 
 
                                                           
9 See Weber (2007) for a discussion about severe problems with composite perception based indices and 
Cooksey (2007) about the low value of this information for individual countries –Tanzania being the case. 
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Box II A Pilot Survey of Utilities Corruption 
To date, utilities have been excluded from firm surveys on corruption because of the small number of such 
firms operating in each country.By working with a global sample covering energy, water, telecoms and 
transport, a survey piloted in two countries in 2007 was designed to overcome this problem while 
generating data on the nature and extent of corruption.  During the pilot, a considerable number of firms 
were willing to take part and answer sensitive questions in a manner that did not suggest reticence to 
highlight cases of corruption under these circumstances.  Nonetheless, because all pilot survey 
conversations were conducted with promises of strict anonymity and confidentiality, only a very limited 
report of the actual results of the interviews can be presented at this stage.  
 
Many of the firms claim that they have probably lost a tender because of corruption.  In one of the pilot 
countries, it was repeatedly alleged that competitive tender procedures were rigged to fit with the offer of 
one specific firm and collusion was rampant.  In the other pilot country, it was alleged that the initial 
contract competition might be fair, but the winning bidder would corrupt officials in order to avoid 
penalties for non-delivery of services.  Firms do not report or complain about alleged cases of corruption 
for fear of losing future business. 
4 Determinants of Corruption and Economic Theory 
The complexity of society, the number of stakeholders and actors involved in political and 
important bureaucratic decisions suggest numerous potential determinants of corruption.
10 Even 
when concentrating on grand corruption and contracts between utility firms and government, the 
number of relevant factors is substantial. A firm’s propensity to be involved in corruption to 
obtain a certain contract will depend on the following characteristics:  
 
i. Personal characteristics of involved agents including (potentially) the nationality and 
gender of main management. 
  
ii. Firm specific characteristics: company size, local or foreign ownership, location of 
headquarters, ownership structure and role in lobbying efforts. 
 
iii. Deal characteristics: the tender offer process, prices and other terms. It is important to 
note that a purpose of the corrupt act itself may often be to influence the nature of the 
transacting process; i.e. what the particular transaction involves (the investing 
opportunity, the form of contract, the nature of the bid process, information available).  
As such, the relationship between particular deal characteristics and corrupt activities 
will be bi-directional. 
 
iv. Sector characteristics: general cross-country factors including technical complexity, 
financing scale, common contract characteristics and so on. Some sector characteristics 
will be highly dependent on country, however, such as the existing extent of 
competition, standard selection procedures, sector ownership criteria, regulatory 
institutions (their capacity and independence), and the perceived extent of corruption in 
the sector.  
 
                                                           
10 This has been tested in many statistical studies during the last decade. Examples of recent contributions 
with very different focus are Mocan (2004), Glaeser and Saks (2005), Knack and Azfar (2002) and 
Treisman (2000). Most statistical studies of corruption are based on weak data on corruption, as discussed 
in chapter 2, and findings are not necessarily valid despite significant results. 
  11v.  Country specific factors: perceived and actual capacity of government and legal 
institutions, cultural aspects, general level of education and so on. 
 
A firm’s involvement in corruption also requires corruptible officials, who will face their own 
incentives based on personal characteristics, employment characteristics, the nature of the deal 
and the oversight and sanctions regimes under which they operate.  Because these 
characteristics may vary within particular ministries or regulatory bodies, it may be that of two 
deals in the same sector and country that are similar in terms of the firms and deal involved, one 
is corrupt and one is not.  Hence, these categories will not cover all factors that are relevant to 
explain corruption; there will be an error term.   
 
The literature on corruption explains and categorizes determinants of corruption and associated 
mechanisms in different ways. In particular, economic theory explains corruption at four 
different “levels”:   
 
i. At the individual level and incentive theory 
Economic incentive theory predicts that an agent, the briber as well as the target of the bribe, is 
assumed to gauge potential rewards of the involvement in corruption against the potential 




The goals of corrupt officials will usually be to make money for themselves or their political 
party. Goals for firms involved in corruption, while all connected to the maximization of profits 
or personal gain, appear more diverse and include a long list of potential benefits.  These 
include guaranteeing license or contract award, adjustments in tender specifications, secret 
information about bids and the evaluation process, license or contract renegotiation and 
adjustment, avoidance or reduction of penalties or termination for breach of licenses or 
contracts, changes in legal directives and regulations, tax concessions and avoidance, subsidy 
award and so on. At the individual level, the briber (the executive in the firm, for instance) is 
expected to evaluate personal costs and benefits, which may be quite straightforwardly 
connected to the firms’ profit.  Beyond the price of the bribe, these costs include potential fines, 




ii. At the company level and theory of industrial organization  
Theories of industrial organization predict that reduced competitive pressure is an important 
driver of business corruption, suggesting that more corruption may be associated with less 
competition (as both cause and effect).
13 There will thus be more corruption when there are 
                                                           
11 For an overview of the literature, see Aidt (2003) or Bardhan (1997).  
12 Some factors are difficult to categorize as either benefits or costs. For instance, reputation and status are 
associated with the achievement of important contracts, and can actually improve in the propensity to be 
corrupt. Loyalty is another aspect with consequences that are difficult to predict, since agents with 
apparently strong moral values will sometimes place loyalty to the firm above loyalty to a country or 
broader moral system.  If their loyalty is placed at the owners or the employees of the firm, and less with 
the society at large, corruption might be considered a ‘moral’ solution.  See Rose-Ackerman (2002, 2007) 
for relevant discussion, and also a review of relevant experimental work on the propensity to become 
involved in corruption.   
13 See Beato and Laffont (2002) for a discussion regarding corruption and competition in regulated 
industries.  Ades and Di Tella (1999); Bliss and Di Tella (1997) and Shleifer (2004) off results on the 
relationship between corruption and competition. See Benitez and Estache, (2005) for a survey of market 
concentration in the utilities sectors.  
  12opportunities to obtain market power, for instance because of regulatory intervention or entry 
restriction. The relationship between competition and corruption is particularly interesting when 
it comes to infrastructure, because competition is often for rather than within the market. Even 
competition for infrastructure contracts is often limited, with only a few firms involved in the 
tender processes.  Complicating the calculus is the fact that the decision to corrupt is likely to 
depend significantly on the perception of the likelihood of corrupt behaviour amongst 
competitors. The theory predicts more corruption when there is asymmetric information about 
the way tender rules are being practiced and when the strategies of rivals are hard to observe. A 
connection between cartel-behaviour and corruption is another implication and also supported 
empirically (Søreide, 2008); collusion (including bid-rigging) is easier to carry out if supported 
by corruption.
14 The pilot survey included questions about collusion. Respondents’ attitudes 
differed significantly in the two countries. What we usually consider bid-rigging strategies were 
defended by several respondents in one of the countries, suggesting that such practices may 
occur in wide scales in some environments in the utility sectors.  
 
Factors described by theory as important to understand firms’ incentives to influence through 
corruption are the size of obtainable rents, regulatory choice, incentive designs, and 
procurement or privatization-related issues. It is nevertheless difficult to come to general 
conclusions from the industrial organization literature regarding corruption in utilities since 
utility industries vary significantly in their economic characteristics, as we have seen in Chapter 
2.  Electricity and Water concessions often involve long-term pricing agreements and subsidy 
payments to private providers --both factors may increase the opportunities for corruption 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).  On the other hand, the significant profits which can accrue to 
holders of mobile spectrum licences create a large incentive to corrupt during the license award 
process.  The role of interconnection pricing on competitiveness and profits is another 
opportunity to extract rents, especially given that it is an extremely complex process frequently 
carried out in secrecy.
15 Different deal structures –from management contracts to full 
privatization—carry significantly different sunk and up-front costs, again altering the potential 
payoffs to different corrupt acts.  
 
iii. At the sector level and regulation theory  
The extent and impact of (grand) corruption will depend on the nature of regulation, and of 
regulatory institutions, in a number of ways. An important proposal, based on regulation theory, 
relates to the independence of regulatory institutions. If not sufficiently independent, politicians 
might influence regulatory decisions, for populist benefits, clear-cut corruption or for patronage 
(i.e. to secure benefits to clan members, elite groups and other supporters).  Of course, 
independent regulation may merely change the structure rather than the extent of corrupt 
payments unless the regulatory body is transparent, well managed and under effective oversight.  
Regardless, ensuring the independence of regulatory bodies has proven difficult in many 
countries, since politicians will hold the monopoly on jurisdiction, and regulatory independence 
will depend on political benevolence. According to one of the respondents interviewed for this 
survey, the financial situation of a formally independent regulatory body may depend heavily on 
how the institution’s decisions have corresponded to political signals.   
 
                                                           
14 The risk of losing cartel profits may explain the low propensity among firms to respond proactively if 
losing contracts because competitors are involved in corruption; firms may not want to risk the potential 
of obtaining future cartel profits.  
15 It is also relevant to ask how the form of influence on regulators might depend on the organization of 
regulation and the prioritizing of political goals. Consumer surplus has not always been priority number 
one, see Auriol (2007) for discussion.  
  13The selection of a service provider to operate under a concession contract is perhaps the 
decision-making process that is most vulnerable to corruption. The selection will often take 
place through competitive bidding, while the concession contract will contain many regulatory 
elements in order to meet various welfare goals. A multiplicity of regulatory goals may open for 
corrupt or populist political influence, however.
16 Contracts that are supposed to meet 
multidimensional achievements – on price, various components of quality, reliability, speed, 
reputation for honesty, financial stability of the contractor and more are difficult to evaluate in 
terms of performance (Tirole, 1994:15). The more criteria included in decision-making 
processes, the more opportunity for discretion, and the easier it will be to influence the 
processes, including through corruption.
17  
 
The nature of corruption will be causally linked in both directions to the process of awarding 
concessions or licenses, negotiations between governments and firms during that process, and 
also firms’ influence on regulatory decisions during operation. In particular, information about 
ex post operational terms will have impacts on ex ante choices in the award of licences, and in 
terms of incentives and vulnerability to corruption in the two processes are interlinked. The 
problem of contractual incompleteness in regulatory law has been much debated, by lawyers as 
well as economists. Disputes and questions without a solution offered by the contracts are and 
should be subject to renegotiation. On the basis of data from Latin America, however, Guasch, 
Laffont and Straub (2003) point to significant risk of manipulation of the renegotiation 
processes in infrastructure concession contracts.  
 
iv. At the government level –political economy and rent-seeking literature 
Political risk and lower trust in legal institutions are viewed as common consequences of 
corruption, and important constraints for firms that wish to invest in and operate a utility. With 
infrastructure in particular, long-term contracts are considered less secure, and firms bear the 
risk of facing changes in operational terms once investments are sunk (Svensson, 2003). In turn, 
informal agreements and corruption may themselves be ways in which firms try to reduce 
political and institutional risk, and bribery itself may be part of a strategy to reduce the overall 
impact of corruption on outcomes (Wells and Ahmed, 2007).  
  
Because grand corruption in utilities involves very large transactions and senior government 
officials, the question of how political decisions are made and how political parties retain power 
is important to understand corruption in relation to private sector utility provision. Political 
agency models predict that the accountability to voters is stronger when politicians can be re-
elected, and honest procedures and welfare-enhancing results are more likely in the first period 
of a political regime than in the second (Besley, 2006; Drazen, 2005).
18  
                                                           
16 Consequences of a multiplicity of goals are well described by Tirole (1994), including in the context of 
regulation of utilities.  
17 Simple award criteria and strict focus on industry performance are the often suggested tools for 
reducing the risk of corruption in face of weak regulatory institutions.  In real life the advice is difficult to 
follow, however.  Rather than a strict focus on the quality of services and prices, regulators are often 
asked to consider 'the best package' for the society at large, and encouraged to make assessments of other 
factors than prices and service provision, such as employment issues, district politics, environmental 
concerns, and so on. It is difficult to know what works when it comes to regulatory complexity: Simple 
regulation is presented as a tool to combat corruption in utilities. Scandinavian countries are characterized 
by heavy regulation combined with low levels of corruption, however. See Estache, Goicoechea and 
Trujillo (2006) for results of liberalization reform and impacts on corruption in utilities.  
18 On the basis of audit reports in Brazil, Ferraz and Finan (2005) find the incidence of corruption and 
fraud to be significantly higher municipalities with political leadership in their second term; i.e. when the 
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Grand corruption may also be part of an international political game, however, because large 
infrastructure contracts – and the regulation of performance - often involve influence from the 
home-country government of the potential operator.
19  As discussed in the introduction, the 
difference between legal political decisions and corruption may be blurred when it comes to 
grand corruption, since decision-makers have significant discretionary authority.  Since they are 
often in a position to change details in the legal framework, they can alter the definition of what 
is legal.
20 The question of how firms are allowed to gain market advantage must thus be 
considered in a broader perspective, including the role of influence from foreign governments. 
Various incentives including promises of biased court decisions, inside information and superior 
access to finance may provide firms with benefits that resemble those obtained through clear-cut 
corruption. We have very limited information about such forms of influence peddling. A 
challenge for research is thus to better understand the role of consultants, banks, and foreign 
governments in the process of manipulating infrastructure contracts and engaging in corruption.  
 
 
4.3 Hypotheses  
Given this discussion based on the relevant literature and status when it comes to empirical 
research on grand corruption in utilities, we list hypotheses that might be tested. Table 3 
highlights some selected theorized relationships between firm, sector and country characteristics 
and corruption outcomes.  
 
Different types of corruption can be substitutes for each other, suggesting the potential for 
interactions between variables and bribe levels.  For example, a corrupt relationship can be 
developed before the tender procedure begins, during the tender procedure, or as part of 
renegotiations – perhaps years after the initial tender procedure is concluded. By changing the 
rules of the game, corruption conducted prior to tendering can ensure the desired outcome while 
tender procedures themselves are not corrupt.
21  In cases where concession contracts substitute 
for explicit regulation in the life of the given contract, the criteria for concession bids which are 
determined by the regulator or policymaker in advance of the award process will be key to both 
the profitability of the concession and the likely bid winner, and will represent an important 
target for bribery.  A successful corrupt act upstream of the bid process may be far more 
effective than a bribe made during bid evaluation in this case.  This suggests that the 
relationships proposed will be dependent, an issue that will need to be further addressed in 





                                                                                                                                                                          
mayors could not be re-elected. Second-term mayors on average divert, R$188,431.4 more than first-term 
mayors (approximately 4 percent of the total amount transferred to municipalities).  
19 For instance, this was the case behind the IMPSA deal in the Philippines, see examples Box 1.  
20 As a result of this limited evidence on the extent and nature of grand corruption in infrastructure, we 
have an incomplete basis for making assumptions about who initiates grand corruption in various settings 
in infrastructure  (the briber or the decision-maker), and what other players are involved. We are unable to 
differentiate between the impacts of illegal corruption, on the one side, and legal rent-seeking, diplomatic 
pressure, and regulatory incompetence, on the other.  
21 Tender corruption is usually carried out either in the form of a violation of formal rules, some form of 
misuse of exemption rules, or influence on the design of the rules, see Rose-Ackerman (1999), Della 
Porta and Vannuci (1999), Moody-Stuart (1997) and Søreide (2005) for more information.  




Theorized Relationship to Propensity to Bribe
∗
Individual Characteristics 
Citizenship   Citizen of the country: more likely 
Gender   Female: less likely  
Colleagues with recent work exp in public 
sector  
More public sector exp: more likely  
Firm Characteristics 
Firm size  Global size: less likely. Local size: uncertain 
Firm ownership structure  Publicly listed: less likely 
Firm ownership location  Low corruption country: less likely 
Sunk cost of total investment  Higher sunk cost: more likely 
No reactions if lost contract due to 
corruption  
No responses: more likely 
Firm anti-corruption codes of conduct   Stronger codes: less likely 
Deal Characteristics 
Sector local partnership requirements  Local ownership requirements: more likely 
Award process   ICB: less likely   
Criteria for award  More criteria: more likely. Subjective criteria: more likely 
Size of bid  Larger bid: more likely  
Sunk cost of bid investment  Higher sunk cost: more likely 
Potential for renegotiation  Higher potential: more likely 
Sector Characteristics 
Competing firms in sector  More competition: less likely 
Subsidy extent in sector  Larger subsidies: more likely 
Perceived level of sector corruption  Higher perception: more likely 
Perceptions about bid-rigging     More bid-rigging: more likely 
Share of state-owned entity in the sector   Larger share: uncertain  
Regulation 
Regulatory independence  More independence: less likely 
Regulatory capacity  Higher capacity: less likely 
Regulatory discretion  More discretion: more likely 
Competing regulatory agencies  More agencies more likely 
Level of regulation  More areas (pricing, quality…): more likely 
Alternate Approaches to Influence 
Influence on laws and regulations   More informal influence on regulations: more likely 
Lobbying (including legal party 
contributions) 
Greater lobbying effort: less likely 
Greater membership of industry groups: less likely 
Investment Country Governance  
Press freedom  Greater freedom: less likely 
Access to information  Greater access: less likely 
Parliamentary oversight  More oversight: less likely 
Competition authority   In function: less likely  
Home Country Governance 
Home country corruption  Less home country corruption: less likely 
Home country OECD Convention 
signatory 
Signatory: less likely 
∗ “more/less likely” refer to risk of corruption. 
 
                                                           
 
  16Potential for empirical verification  
The listed hypotheses refer to practices that will most often be hidden and illegal, and support or 
rejection requires information that the agents involved have every incentive to hide. Robust 
verification or rejection will be difficult, but even limited progress towards better evidence for 
or against such hypotheses will provide a stronger basis for analysis of policy choices.  
 
The methodological challenges are significant, however. A first challenge is the quality of data 
that can be collected.  Evidence from analysis of existing surveys suggests that even where large 
enterprise samples are available, the signal to noise ratio in answers regarding the level of 
corruption in a particular sector can be very low (Kenny, 2006).  Corruption is a secret activity, 
and few respondents may have direct experience and accurate information regarding the nature 
and extent of bribery. 
 
Such issues will be even more acute in a survey of infrastructure providers.  There are a limited 
number of firms involved in private provision of infrastructure worldwide, and the number 
involved in contract bidding or operation in any one country is very small.  As noted, this 
challenge has led previous enterprise surveys focusing on corruption to exclude infrastructure 
providers altogether.  Stricter anonymity and confidentiality procedures which limit ability to 
share underlying data from a survey report will be necessary, but statistical confidence in 
country-level answers will (surely) remain very low regardless.  Ensuring a wide geographic, 
sectoral and firm coverage will be key to increasing the robustness of any results.   
 
It is worth noting that the data quality issue will extend to control variables in areas such as the 
level of competition, performance and sector regulatory structures which can be very weak.  
Including some questions regarding such performance and characteristics within the survey 
instrument may help to improve this situation, but, if the instrument is to remain a reasonable 
length, such questions will be necessarily limited. 
 
A further challenge is the presence of numerous bi-causal and interlinked relationships between 
different types of corrupt and legal transaction a well as institutional forms.  This complex 
causal environment, not significantly analyzed to date and likely to vary significantly by 
country and sector, will be difficult to unpack.   
 
Despite these obstacles, a survey with wide geographic, sectoral and firm coverage, including a 
number of questions which overlap to measure the extent of consistency across answers, may 
play some role in increasing our (currently limited) knowledge about the nature and extent of 
corruption in the private provision of utility services.   
5 Conclusion   
The nature of private provision of infrastructure suggests that governance will be key to 
outcomes.  This is confirmed by available evidence –poorly governed sectors perform poorly in 
terms of pricing, quality and access.  There is considerable anecdotal evidence linking poor 
governance to greater corruption, and suggesting that private provision of infrastructure is a 
particular target of grand corruption.   
 
At the same time, and despite a range of hypotheses that could be tested using such evidence, 
we have almost no survey evidence to analyze the nature or extent of grand corruption in the 
private provision of infrastructure. Available perceptions evidence and broader non-sector-
specific survey evidence both appear ill-designed as a proxy measure.  But lack of survey 
evidence to date reflects the particular nature of private provision of infrastructure and suggests 
  17the need for an infrastructure-specific survey instrument to examine the extent of corruption in 
private provision across sectors and countries.   
 
The nature of corruption surveys and the nature of the sector should dampen expectations of 
highly robust data being produced by such a survey, particularly at the sector/country level, 
where confidentiality issues may not allow the publication of any data at all for many countries.  
Nevertheless, the pilot study referred to suggests that it will be possible to obtain important 
indicative evidence and insights.  Many respondents are willing to inform about their 
experiences and frustrations.  Even if precise quantification of grand corruption may be 
difficult, a broad survey may reveal important mechanisms and offer insights about the 
efficiency of current anti-corruption measures.  Such understanding is needed to develop better 
policy advice on how to prevent challenges associated with grand corruption and curb its 
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